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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the relationship 
between concentration of the banking sector and banks' markups on offered 
loans. The markup is understood as the difference between the rate offered by 
banks and the reference rate fixed by the Monetary Policy Council. The period 
between 2009 and 2013 was analyzed. Monthly data from the Polish banking 
sector were considered. This paper also consists of the literature review, which 
focuses on the mortgage market. The methodology used for the analysis is based 
mainly on simple linear regression techniques. It is found that such methods are 
not sufficient to give conclusive answers. Therefore additional future research is 
proposed.  
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Introduction  
The process of consolidation of banks has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Consolidated banks can use their assets more efficiently. They are also more 
competitive, especially on the global market, where a player must be sufficiently 
large in order to participate. This might provide some benefits for customers also. 
Through mergers and takeovers, banks can become more innovative and they can 
diversify their capital. Non-efficient branches are closed or taken over by 
profitable and efficient banks, which leads to the optimization of the banking 
sector as a whole.  
On the other hand, concentration leads a market towards oligopoly. As a result, 
banks gain the advantage over consumers. They can abuse the financial market 
and put too much pressure on the whole economy. As a result, there is no 
common opinion on the effect of concentration of the banking sector.  
However, it has to be remembered that the Polish banking sector has been 
dynamically evolving since 1989. Not only have the processes associated with 
globalization intensified since then, but this time period was also marked by a 
transition in economy. In order to switch towards a capitalist economy, banks 
were privatized. There has also been a significant role of foreign capital in these 
processes. 
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Before 1993, there were many banks. Consolidation processes began mainly 
because of the low level of capital held by these banks, as well as high 
competition from foreign banks. Also, the number of banks was inadequate to suit 
market needs. Moreover, economies of scale played an important role.  
There were 43 mergers and takeovers in the banking sector between 1993 and 
2004 in Poland. As a result, the number of banks controlled by domestic investors 
declined from 48 to 8 in this period. On the other hand, the number of banks 
controlled by foreign investors increased from 10 to 41 (Kraciuk, 2006; 
Pawłowska, 2003; Stępień, 2004).  
Therefore it is interesting to analyze some recent, short-term (noticed between 
2010 and 2013) processes with a stress on costs paid by customers. In this paper 
the increase of concentration ratio of the five biggest banks (measured by the 
share in total banking assets), is analyzed with regards to whether it can 
significantly influence the difference between interest rates offered by banks to 
customers and the reference rate fixed by the Monetary Policy Council. Some 
special attention is paid to the impact on housing loans rates.  
1 Literature review  
Banks consolidate due to the potential benefits. There are various explanations 
for this process (Micek, 2002), but the most important ones are: corporate 
synergy, geographic expansion, product diversification, cost reduction, new 
market expansion, increase in the share of credit and deposit market, prestige 
from being the leader, competitive advantage, reducing information asymmetry.  
The paper by Kokoszczyński (2001) presents a concise historical review of 
consolidation processes in the Polish banking sector after the fall of communism 
in Poland. Currently the Polish banking sector is quite stable and concentration is 
rather stabilized. Its profitability is good. It has increased especially after the EU 
accession (Piocha, Radlińska, 2010).  
1.1 Advantages and disadvantages of the concentration   
Lakic (2013) argues that bank concentration leads to various pathological 
situations: abuse of the credit system, mechanism of interest rate, derivative 
market, etc. High banking concentration leads towards monopoly. In practice, 
there is no real control over such huge institution by the official authorities. Big 
banks, knowing that they are "too big to fail", can take exceedingly high risks 
(Carletti, Hartmann, 2002).  
Herring and Wachter (1998) argue that real estate cycles and banking crises are 
significantly correlated. They warn that if banks hold too much of the country’s 
assets, it might have severe consequences on the nations economy. Garmaise 
and Moskowitz (2004) analyzed data from 11 states in U.S. between 1992 and 
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1999. They focused on the social costs of bank mergers. They found that bank 
mergers usually lead to worsening credit terms and therefore to less development 
and investment. These may decrease real estate prices and harm poorer 
households. In the longer term it increases the number of property crimes. In 
fact, mergers reduce bank competition which has a positive impact on credit 
terms.  
Allen et al. (2012) have discusses that a merger has an impact on customers by 
worsening the negotiations process. But the overall impact on average rates is 
small. The market may still remain competitive. In the case of mortgage rates, 
financial literacy of customers plays an important role.  
Basing on the SCP (structure-conduct-perform) paradigm, Allen et al. (2001) 
argue that there are negative social effects arising from high banking sector 
concentration. Ferreira (2013) also found that an increase in bank concentration 
decreases bank efficiency. This is because of small competition present in 
concentrated markets.  
On the other hand, bank concentration can expand access to long-term credit. 
Bank concentration can play a positive role on the market, by influencing a firms' 
debt structure (González, González, 2008). Levine (2004) has found that entry 
restrictions on foreign banks can lead to an increase in loan rates. On the other 
hand, such restriction on domestic banks do not increase loan rates.  
Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2008) analyzed over 18000 banks (also cooperative ones) 
from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain and their activity 
between 1997 and 2005. They have found that there is a negative correlation 
between bank concentration and financial distress. But this is mainly due to the 
role of savings and cooperative banks. If the sample is restricted to commercial 
and listed banks there is a positive correlation between bank concentration and 
financial distress. Moreover, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) have found that the 
increase in banking concentration lead to worsening of financial soundness of 
banks. Their research is based on a sample of more than 2600 banks from the 
EU-25 for the period between 1997 and 2005.  
It is usually thought that a high ratio of state-owned banks results in less access 
to credit and reduced financial system stability. On the other hand, foreign-owned 
banks are perceived as the ones offering competitive prices and accessible credits 
for customers (Berger et al., 2004; Santillán Salgado, 2011).  
Based on the data from 70 countries for the period between 1980 and 1997, Beck 
et al. (2003) has concluded that concentration in the banking sector reduces the 
risk of crisis. Decreasing the regulations of restrictions on bank competition and 
bank activities also has positive results for the economy. Moreover, deregulations 
can intensify the competition of public institutions.   
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A high concentration in the banking sector can lead to higher profitability of 
various financial institutions. Also, supervision and control by the authorities is 
easier. As a result, there is a smaller risk of crisis (Allen, Gale, 2000).  
1.2 Impact on housing market   
Renaud (2009) emphasizes that for the first time in the world history more people 
live in urban areas than in rural areas. As a result, the financial system connected 
with housing becomes an increasingly important part of the whole economy. 
Housing loans will increase, because urban expansion intensifies. This cannot be 
covered by government expenditures solely. On the other hand, D'Arista (2009) 
has noticed that the traditional role of a bank as a lending institution declines. 
Household savings are not invested in banking deposits, but rather in mutual and 
pension funds.  
Sørensen and Lichtenberger (2007) have found slight evidence that smaller 
concentration in banking sector might lead to lower mortgage rates. Their 
research is based on the Eurozone countries. Calza et al. (2009) have found that 
the features of residential mortgage markets differ significantly across 
industrialized countries. Moreover, the transmission of monetary policy shocks to 
residential investment and house prices is stronger in countries with more flexible 
and developed mortgage markets.  
Favara and Imbs (2010) have found that branch banking deregulation can lead to 
an increase in house prices, due to an increase in mortgages. They have 
researched house prices in the U.S. between 1994 and 2005. The bank branching 
deregulation was measured by methods of Rice and Strahan (2010). Bergstresser 
(2008) has analyzed the period between 1980 and 1994 in the U.S. It has been 
found that the increase in bank concentration reduced the flow of bank capital to 
construction and land development loans. Iacoviello (2002) has found significant 
impact of tight monetary policy on the decrease of real house prices in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK for the periods covering late 1970s till 
1998.  
The debate on links between housing and macroeconomics dates back to Fischer 
(1933) and his debt deflation theory. Residential capital stock plays an important 
role in the economy, housing expenses constitute an important part of household 
expenditures, etc. (Chetty, Szeidl, 2004; Greenwood, Hercowitz, 1991; Skinner, 
1994). The relationship of macroeconomics and the housing market has been 
extensively studied for developed countries (for example: Davis, Heathcote, 
2005; Hwang, Quigley, 2006; Seko, 2003; Wen, 2001).  
Mortgage banks have a small share in the mortgage loans market in Poland. 
Mortgages are dominated by universal banks, which hold over 98% of all housing 
loans. The housing market cycle has a small impact on the Polish banking system. 
Despite some disadvantages on the market, there has been no price bubble, 
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because of permanent impediments on supply and demand. Also, supervisory 
recommendations were implemented on time (Lissowska, Szufler, 2012).   
The polish property market has not gone through the full housing cycle yet. In 
fact, it is a young market. It is in its first periods of a cycle in comparison with 
U.S. or some European markets. Nevertheless it is highly vulnerable to financial 
market behavior and both fiscal and monetary policies (Łaszek et al., 2009).    
The impact of interest rates on housing supply is significant, especially in the case 
of long-term relationship (Augustyniak et al., 2013). It is expected (Brzoza-
Brzezina, 2005) that in the case of euro adoption there would be a significant 
increase in loans. The impact of euro adoption on the housing market is an 
interesting question by itself. Generally, they are low interest rates (required by 
Maastricht criteria), which influence the credit boom (Eichengreen, Steiner, 2008). 
On the other hand, interest rates are still quite low. This is due to the expectation 
of euro adoption and the reaction to the recent financial crisis. For example, such 
a situation has occurred in Slovakia (Hüfner, 2009). If long-term expenditures 
exceed incomes, there must be a moment when severe reduction in expenditures 
will happen. A recession may begin as a result. Moreover, even if wages would 
increase, it would be naturalized by interest costs. In other words: credit can 
boost both economic growth and recession (Rytelewska, Huszczonek, 2004). 
Aggressive lending instruments magnify the cycle (Pavlov, Wachter, 2006; 
Tsatsaronis, Zhu 2004).  
2 Methodology and Data  
In order to maintain clarity, abbreviations of all analyzed variables are presented 
in Table 1.  
Table 1 Explanation of variables 
CONC assets of 5 biggest banks / total banking assets 
AS log of total banking assets 
NI log of net income of banking sector 
NIC log of non-interest costs of banking sector 
NIR log of non-interest revenues of banking sector 
BR number of branches of banks 
EMP number of people employed in banking sector 
EMPH number of people employed in headquarters of banks 
PCRED average credit rate - reference rate 
PnCRE average rate for new credits - reference rate 
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PCRED_H average rate for credits for households - reference rate 
PnCRED_H average rate for new credits for households - reference rate 
PCONS_H average rate for consumption credits  for households - reference rate 
PnCONS_H average rate for new consumption credits for households - reference rate 
PDEP average rate for deposits - reference rate 
PnDEP average rate for new deposits - reference rate 
PMORT average housing loan rate - reference rate 
PnMORT average rate for new housing loan - reference rate 
CRED average credit rate 
RR reference rate 
Source: Own elaboration  
Kozak (2008) has noticed that the difference between credit rate and reference 
rate (see also Rousseas, 1985) increases slightly, if concentration increases. The 
research has been done for U.S. market between 1994 and 2005. Also, some 
other factors have been considered in the constructed model. Therefore in this 
paper a similar (but not the same) methodology is adopted, but for the Polish 
market. For example, in the case of the U.S., Berger and Hannan (1989) have 
found that the increase in concentration decreases the deposit rate in comparison 
with the reference rate. Similar conclusions have been stated by Hannan and 
Prager (1998) and Rhoades (1996). On the other hand, Erel (2011) has argued 
that the concentration allows banks to use their capital more efficiently and 
therefore margins on loans can be smaller.  
Various ratios can be applied in order to measure the bank concentration ratio. 
The choice is usually based on the individual needs and data availability. There is 
no privileged choice of the ratio. One possibility is to consider CR5. CR5 is called 
the concentration ratio of the five biggest banks.  The concentration itself is 
measured for example by the share in total assets (Rogowski, 2001).  
This research is based on monthly date from the period between 31.12.2009 and 
30.11.2013. The date has been possessed from KNF (2013) and NBP (2013) 
official statistics. Calculations and graphs have been done in GRETL.   
3 Analysis  
It can be observed that the concentration (CONC) has significantly increased in 
the analyzed period. However, it has been fluctuating between 2010 and 2012, 
but the real increase happened in 2012 and 2013. This increase is not great in 
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absolute values. Moreover, it should be noticed that this value is rather small in 
comparison to other European countries.  
There is also a significant increase in the number of branches during the analyzed 
period. It is worthwhile to mention that the two biggest market players have 
relatively many branches, whereas other banks have rather few branches. 
On the other hand, the number of people employed in the banking sector 
increased in 2010 and in the first half of 2011, but then it started to decrease. 
Currently, this number is similar to that from the beginning of 2010. However, 
there is a continuous and significant trend in increasing employment in banks' 
headquarters. Details for the general characteristics of the banking sector are 
presented on Figure 1.  
Figure 1 General characteristics for the analyzed period 
Source: Author’s elaboration in GRETL, based on KBN (2013) and NBP (2013) 
The average credit rate has fallen by almost 2.38 pp. in the analyzed period. This 
is due to the Monetary Policy Council's reaction to the recent financial crisis. It 
can also be observed that average credit rate behaves as the reference rate. 
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There seems to be no delay in reducing credit rates by commercial banks after 
the Monetary Policy Council's decisions about the level of the reference rate.  
Further, in this paper, it will be verified, whether the difference between the 
interest rate for different types of credits and the reference rate is somehow 
influenced by concentration ratio (and some other factors). However, it is 
interesting that this difference declines with time. Therefore, even though, the 
concentration increases, the markup of banks decreases. Details are presented on 
Figure 2. For other interest rates, please see Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix.  
Figure 2 Average credit rate, reference rate and selected markups 
Source: Author’s elaboration in GRETL, based on NBP (2013) 
Moreover, at a 5% significance level non-stationarity of CONC cannot be rejected 
in the case of the ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) test (Adkins, 2010). Therefore 
it is reasonable to state that the concentration increased and that this is not a 
random effect, indeed. (In this analysis 12 lags have always been used in any 
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performance test that requires some number of lags. This is because monthly 
data are considered.)    
However it is interesting that performing ADF tests at a 5% significance level 
allows rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of PCRED, but not for 
PnCRE. Repeating the ADF test for other markups leads to the conclusion that 
PnCRED_H, PnCONS_H, PnMORT, PDEP and PnDEP are non-stationary, whereas 
PCRED_H, PCONS_H and PMORT are stationary.   
This is quite a reasonable result. Markups on average rates are stationary, so 
there is no significant trend in their time evolution. As a result, they are suitable 
variables for a regression model. On the other hand, markups for new loans are 
non-stationary, i.e. some trends are significant. It might be, for example, due to 
the recent financial crises and changes in credit policies. However, such variables, 
if unmodified, cannot be used in a regression model. Using them can give 
"spurious regression". In other words: a nicely looking model can be obtained 
(with high R-squared), but there might be no causal connection between the 
variables (Granger, Newbold, 1974; Parker, 2013; Nielsen 2005).  
The only exception from the above regularity is deposit rate, for which both 
average and recent rates are non-stationary.  
Similarly as in the paper by Kozak (2008), it can be supposed that the considered 
markups are influenced by concentration of the banking sector, total banking 
assets, net income of banking sector, non-interest costs and non-interest 
revenues of the banking sector, number of branches and number of people 
employed in the whole sector and in headquarters. Such a relation can be 
motivated by economics theory.  
Therefore linear regression models have been constructed for all previously 
considered markups. Stepwise regression with backward elimination (Cody, 2011) 
has been performed. A ten percent significance level has been assumed for 
significance of coefficients.  
The results are presented in Table 2. For results of "spurious regression" please 
see Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix. It is interesting that in both cases (stationary 
and non-stationary) the signs of coefficients are the same. The only exception are 
coefficients for NIC and BR and one exception for AS.  
The obtained models explain changes in the dependent variables quite well (high 
R-squared). In three models out of four the concentration ratio has a significant 
and positive impact on bank markups. On the other hand, an increase in total 
banking assets or in net income has the opposite effect. The other variables are 
significant only in half of the obtained models. EMPH is not significant for any 
model.  
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Table 2 Regression estimates 
 PCRED PCONS_H PCRED_H PMORT 
const 0.419416 0.77408 1.01214 0.0970906 
CONC 0.0616278 0.0990081 0.0635673 0 
AS -0.0132696 -0.0262868 -0.0341119 0 
NI -0.0136716 -0.0141661 -0.0160369 -0.0093258 
NIR 0.0120637 0 0.0142652 0 
NIC 0 0.0124601 0 0.00829045 
BR 0 7.15246e-06 0 3.2849e-06 
EMP 0 0 0 -4.49147e-07 
EMPH 0 0 0 0 
R-squared  0.849796  0.663869  0.929218  0.564381 
Source: Author’s elaboration in GRETL, based on KNF (2013) and NBP (2013) 
Unfortunately, it has to be remembered that CONC is non-stationary. Moreover, 
the problem of stationarity is present for other independent variables. In fact, 
using a simple linear regression model becomes questionable, because it is 
desired that all variables included in a model are stationary. The discussed 
relationship between selected variables should be checked with some other 
methods for example, a cointegration property methods (Engle, Granger, 1987; 
Granger, 1981; Adkins, 2010) can be applied. On the other hand, the constructed 
models are still worth a short discussion. At least, variables have not been 
selected without any economic reasoning. Therefore, as far as now, the obtained 
models should be treated as "dangerous" rather than "completely wrong" (see 
also Diebold, 2006). The specification of the models has been based on some 
presumptions, indeed.  
Jarque-Bery test for normality of distribution of residuals for a PCRED model, at 
5% significance level, confirms that residuals have a normal distribution. The 
same conclusion is valid for PCONS_H, PCRED_H and PMORT models. This fact is 
a desired one for a regression model. Unfortunately, the RESET test for model 
linear specification confirms that PCRED and PCONS_H are badly specified. On the 
other hand, models for PCRED_H and PMORT can be assumed linear. The Breush-
Pagan test confirms that residuals in all models are homoscedastic. This is a nice 
property for a linear regression model. The Breusch-Godfrey test for 
autocorrelation (up to 12th order) of residuals indicated some slight problems for 
all models. In all tests 5% significance level has been assumed. Finally, all models 
have small Durbin-Watson statistics, which together with high R-squared, can be 
a sign of the mentioned "spurious regression" (Granger, Newbold, 1974).  
Moreover, it can be concluded from the obtained models that an increase in the 
concentration increases the markups. But analyzing Figures 1 and 2 leads to the 
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opposite conclusion. Therefore, relying on the above discussion, the proposed 
linear models are not suitable in the current form. In fact, they are a good 
starting point for future research. Yet, it is known that a simple linear regression 
for non-transformed variables will not work well.  
The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between bank markups and 
concentration ratio. Having in mind the discussed stationarity problem, the ADF 
test has been performed for the first differences of CONC. This time series is still 
non-stationarity. However, the second differences of CONC can be assumed 
stationary at a 10% significance level. At the same significance level: the second 
differences of PnCRE, the third differences of PnCONS_H, the third differences of 
PnCRED_H, the third differences of PnMORT, the third differences PDEP, the fourth 
differences of PnDEP have occurred to be the smallest order differences, which 
are stationary.  
Therefore a collection of linear regression models with one independent variable 
(second differences of CONC) has been constructed. The results are presented in 
Table 3.  
Table 3 Regression estimates 
 PCRED 
2nd diff. 
PnCRE 
PCRED_H 
3rd diff. 
PnCRED_H 
const 0.0434021*** -8.5332e-05 0.052905*** 3.05535e-05 
2nd diff. CONC 0.0174392 -0.101564 0.0232228 -0.113636 
R-squared 0.002068 0.013386 0.001504 0.008238 
     
 PCONS_H 
3rd diff. 
PnCONS_H 
PMORT 
3rd diff. 
PnMORT 
const 0.106097*** -1.7897e-05 0.0230934*** 1.44846e-05 
2nd diff. CONC 0.00521318 -0.321364 0.00911311 0.0962809* 
R-squared 0.000148 0.038514 0.001607 0.067015 
     
 
3rd diff. 
PDEP 
4th diff. 
PnDEP 
  
const 7.36908e-05 3.17044e-05   
2nd diff. CONC -0.0104519 0.2388***  
* 10% 
significance 
level 
R-squared 0.001312 0.208785  
*** 1% 
significance 
level 
Source: Author’s elaboration in GRETL, based on KNF (2013) and NBP (2013) 
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The obtained models have very small R-squared values. However, this might be 
mainly due to the use of just one independent variable. In most of the models, 
the coefficient for the independent variable is statistically not significant at the 
5% significance level. However, in the model for the 3rd differences of PnMORT 
and 4th differences of PnDEP the independent variable is significant, indeed. 
These models indicate that there is a positive relationship between bank markup 
and concentration ratio. Unfortunately, none of the models is significant as a 
whole.  
Conclusions 
The methods used in this paper do not indicate that the concentration of the 
banking sector results in the increase of the difference between offered loan rates 
and the reference rate. Although, from the constructed models there is a weak 
indication that it might happen, but the models itself are questionable.  
The problems that have emerged during the regression diagnostic are mainly 
connected with non-stationarity of variables. Of course, such problems are 
workable (Adkins, 2010; Cody, 2011; Engle, Granger, 1987; Granger, 1981; 
Nielsen, 2005; Parker, 2013). However, they need quite more subtle methodology 
than simple linear regression. Therefore it is not possible to give a quick and 
simple answer for the problem analyzed in this paper. In fact, it has been proved 
that more sophisticated methods are a must.  
On the other hand, graphical analysis tends to indicate that there is a weak 
negative relationship between the concentration of the banking sector and the 
difference between offered loan rates and the reference rate. Therefore, as far as 
now, it cannot be answered what is this relationship actually. Further research is 
necessary.  
It could be asked, why such a short period has been used for the analysis. The 
Polish banking sector, understood as part of a capitalist economy, is a young one. 
Poland has been a member of the European Union since 2004. Three years after 
this transition, the global financial crisis started. Also, banking law (itself, but also 
recommendations, etc.) has been changed quite often. These facts influenced the 
banking system strongly. Therefore any analysis of a longer period should include 
these factors. It does not seem to be possible in a reasonably short paper.  
In consideration of the above facts, it should be mentioned that banks advantage 
over consumers may be not solely from markups on rates. In the case of the 
recent crisis and worsening of households' financial conditions, banks might lower 
markups, but worsen some terms and conditions. Moreover, in the case of a loan, 
the markup on the rate is not the only source of the bank's profits. There are 
other costs as well.  
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The data required to perform these additional analyses are not easily accessible. 
Moreover, research focusing on terms and conditions should be more qualitative 
rather than quantitative. This makes the whole problem more complex. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 3 Selected markups 
Source: Own elaboration in GRETL, based on NBP (2013) 
 
No. 2/2014 
 
43 
Figure 4 Selected markups 
Source: Own elaboration in GRETL, based on NBP (2013) 
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Table 4 Regression estimates 
 PnCRE PnCONS_H PnCRED_H 
const 0.537499 3.64188 0.951073 
CONC 0 0 0 
AS 0 -0.113996 0 
NI -0.0301861 0 -0.0216027 
NIR 0.0863886 0 0.118207 
NIC -0.0601147 -0.00230188 -0.100298 
BR 0 0 -1.10765e-05 
EMP -2.18556e-06 -4.22918e-06 -3.87249e-06 
EMPH 0 6.27072e-06 0 
R-squared  0.779981  0.441775  0.833087 
Source: Own elaboration in GRETL, based on KNF (2013) and NBP (2013) 
 
Table 5 Regression estimates 
 PnMORT PDEP PnDEP 
const 0.228244 1.41527 -0.496013 
CONC 0.0565545 0 0 
AS 0 -0.0361382 0.0192108 
NI -0.0159656 0 0 
NIR 0.040111 0 0.0003818 
NIC -0.0257871 0  
BR -3.22892e-06 4.58485e-06 0 
EMP -9.09359e-07 -2.48771e-06 -7.07141e-07 
EMPH 0 0 0 
R-squared  0.908702  0.800919  0.513833 
Source: Own elaboration in GRETL, based on KNF (2013) and NBP (2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
